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INTRODUCTION
According to the United States Patent Act, a patent holder is granted exclusivity for twenty years.1 Within this bundle of exclusive rights is the right to
make, use, offer for sale, sell, or import into the United States.2 In addition, it
*Judicial Law clerk to the Honorable Judge Robert A. Molloy, in the Complex Litigation Division,
United States Virgin Island, previously Assistant Attorney General in the Territory of Guam, J.D.,
2017, Marquette Law School, Member of IPLR 2016-2017, Bachelor of Science in Nursing from the
University of Wisconsin-Madison. The author thanks her mentors at the United States District Court—
Eastern District of Wisconsin, the United States District Court—Western District of Wisconsin, and
the United States Court of Federal Claims, in Washington DC. The author, also, thanks the editors of
MIPLR, especially McKenzie Subart, for their input. Admitted to practice in Wisconsin, Guam, and
has successfully litigated before the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims, has published
for the American Bar Association, and spoke before the Intellectual Property Law Division of the
ABA. The opinions in this Article are the Author’s alone and do not reflect the views of the Judiciary
of the Virgin Islands.
1. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012), amended by Pub. L. 112-211 (Supp. V 2018). Generally, the
term of a new patent is twenty years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in
the United States. Id.
2. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(1) (2012) (“Every patent . . . grant[s] to the patentee . . . the right to exclude others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States
or importing the invention into the United States . . . .”). A patent is a property right issued by the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (the “USPTO”). 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012), amended by Pub.
L. 112-211 (Supp. V 2018). The patent right is for a limited time. 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012),
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provides for the exclusive right to license the use of a named and described
invention.3 However, the exception to these rights is compulsory licensing.4
Compulsory licensing operates when government authorities license a patent,
under certain conditions, without the patent holder’s permission.5 On the international stage, the original authority is the Paris Convention for the Protection
of Industrial Property (the “Paris Convention”), which protects patents filed in
a foreign country where the patented product or process is marketed and sold.6
“The Paris Convention has been revised from time to time . . . . Each of the
revision conferences, starting with the Brussels Conference in 1900, ended with
the adoption of a revised Act of the Paris Convention.”7 With a few exceptions,8 all those earlier Acts are still current and form the legal basis of the Trade

amended by Pub. L. 112-211 (Supp. V 2018); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“Congress shall
have power . . . to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”). In exchange
for the patent right, a public disclosure of the invention is required. Patent, LEGAL INFO. INST.,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/patent [https://perma.cc/X4NL-C4GV] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019).
3. 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2012), amended by Pub. L. 112-211 (Supp. V 2018) (“Applications for
patent, patents, or any interest therein, shall be assignable in law by an instrument in writing. The
applicant, patentee, or his assigns or legal representatives may in like manner grant and convey an
exclusive right under his application for patent, or patents . . . .”).
4. Exceptions and Limitations to Patent Rights, WIPO, https://www.wipo.int/patents/en/topics/exceptions_limitations.html [https://perma.cc/722W-L5QR] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019).
5. Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, WTO: TRIPS AND HEALTH:
FREQUENTLY
ASKED
QUESTIONS,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/public_health_faq_e.htm [https://perma.cc/M7AF-3B2F] (last visited May 9, 2017). Compulsory licensing is one of the flexibilities on patent protection included in the WTO’s Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (“TRIPS”) Agreement. Id.
6. Summary of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (1883), WIPO
(Sept.
21,
2019),
https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ip/paris/summary_paris.html
[https://perma.cc/BT6Q-RFU2]; John N. Adams, History of the Patent System, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PATENT LAW AND THEORY 2, 25 (Toshiko Takenaka ed., 2019). “A Diplomatic Conference convened in Paris in 1883, which ended with final approval and signature of the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property . . . signed by 11 States: Belgium, Brazil, El Salvador,
France, Guatemala, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Serbia, Spain, and Switzerland.” WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use, WIPO 241 (2004), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/pubdocs/en/wipo_pub_489.pdf [https://perma.cc/72LS-ETV6]. Great Britain, Tunisia and Ecuador also
joined when the Paris Convention went into effect on July 7, 1884. Id. After 1950, membership
increased significantly. See generally Contracting Parties > Paris Convention (Total Contracting
Parties: 177), WIPO: WIPO-ADMINISTERED TREATIES, https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?country_id=ALL&start_year=ANY&end_year=ANY&search_what=C&treaty_id=2
[https://perma.cc/MA94-AU9X] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019).
7. WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use, supra note 6, at 241–42.
8. Id. at 242. “With the exception of the Acts concluded at the revision conferences of Brussels
(1897 and 1900) and Washington, D.C. (1911), which are no longer in force,” the remainder of the
Paris Convention is largely intact; it forms the statutory framework for the Intellectual Property agreements to follow. Id.
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Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (“TRIPS”) Agreement.9 The World
Trade Organization (the “WTO”) adopted the Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (the “Doha Declaration”) in 2001, which reaffirmed
compulsory licensing as a way to combat global public health issues of access
to medicines in low- and middle-income countries (“LMICs”).10 Notably, India
and China have been late additions to the early agreements but extremely punctual in adopting the Doha Declaration, which allows broader compulsory licensing.11
This paper will examine the challenges of international compulsory licensing by examining the issue historically and legally as well as offer possible
solutions. Thus, this paper will explore the challenge of balancing corporate
interests against the affordability and availability of pharmaceuticals by focusing on discrete situations in developing countries, the history of compulsory
licensing, and how the World Health Organization (the “WHO”) and the WTO
have attempted to tackle these challenges through compulsory licensing, and it
will suggest a possible framework for use in arbitration, which balances equities through a Georgia-Pacific analysis.
Part I discusses the equities of patent owners versus consumers who live in
developing countries. Part II discusses the history of compulsory licensing.
Part III reviews some of the WTO’s attempts to settle international disputes,
along with the financial implications of settlement with individual countries on
a case-by-case basis. Part IV examines how Georgia-Pacific12 can be used as
a guide for arbitration in international patent disputes in compulsory licensing
as applied to some discrete compulsory licensing cases.
9. See Part I–General Provisions and Basic Principles, WTO: URUGUAY ROUND
AGREEMENT:
TRIPS,
https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-trips_03_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/G4CX-6CVX] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019) (stating the text of Article 2, which is
about intellectual property conventions).
10. See Reed Beall & Randall Kuhn, Trends in Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals Since
the Doha Declaration: A Database Analysis, 9 PLOS MED. 1, 2 (2012).
11. See Vanessa Bradford Kerry & Kelley Lee, TRIPS, the Doha Declaration and Paragraph
6 Decision: What are the Remaining Steps for Protecting Access to Medicines?, 3 GLOBALIZATION &
HEALTH 1, 3 (2007) (“The 2005 date of compliance for most LMICs includes countries that are major
suppliers of generic drugs such as India, Brazil and China.”) (citing Janice M. Mueller, Taking Trips
to India–Novartis, Patent Law and Access to Medicines, 356 NEW ENG. J. MED. 541–43 (2007)); see
also India Accedes to Paris Convention, INST. FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y: THE HINDU BUS. LINE
(Feb.
15,
1999),
https://www.iatp.org/news/india-accedes-to-paris-convention
[https://perma.cc/PM5W-WL3N] (discussing the Indian government’s decision to join the Paris Convention in 1998); Paris Notification No. 114: Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Accession by the People’s Republic of China, WIPO: WIPO-ADMINISTERED TREATIES:
NOTIFICATIONS,
https://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/notifications/paris/treaty_paris_114.html
[https://perma.cc/U8JP-Q2DF] (last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (stating that China will become a member
of the Paris Union on March 19, 1985).
12. Georgia-Pacific v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), modified sub
nom. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood-Champion Papers, Inc., 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971).
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I. BALANCING EQUITIES: PATENT HOLDERS VS. THIRD WORLD CONSUMERS
The affordability and availability of pharmaceuticals are often viewed, and
generally framed, as one of supply and demand; yet the issue is much more
complicated than that.13 The cost of bringing a single drug to market is staggering.14 The cost to bring one new drug to market is now estimated at more
than 2.6 billion dollars.15 Most companies seek to recoup these research and
development expenses after a drug becomes successful in the marketplace.16
This success also has to offset the expenses of complex double-blind clinical
trials, the greater focus on chronic and degenerative diseases, and test-seeking
to demonstrate comparative drug effectiveness data.17 In addition to these
costs, the cost of drugs that are unsuccessful must also be figured into the analysis.18
In stark contrast to corporate billions spent on pharmaceutical development
are individual consumers in impoverished developing and third-world countries
with limited resources to spend on medicines.19 In LMICs, up to 90% of the
population pays for medicine on an out-of-pocket basis; it is the largest household expense after food.20 The burden is especially great for a family needing
13. See Glenna M. Crooks et al., Pharmaceutical Marketplace Dynamics, NAT’L POL’Y
HEALTH F., No. 755 1, 2 (2000), https://www.nhpf.org/library/issue-briefs/IB755_RxMarketplace_531-00.pdf [https://perma.cc/D92G-5U9L] (“Hardly a day has gone by lately without some new reflection of the tension between commercial and scientific accomplishments of the drug companies on one
hand, and the disparity of the spread of the benefits of those accomplishments [on the other].”).
14. See Rick Mullin, Cost to Develop New Pharmaceutical Drug Now Exceeds $2.5 Billion,
SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN (Nov. 24, 2014), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/cost-to-developnew-pharmaceutical-drug-now-exceeds-2-5b/ [https://perma.cc/4J4Z-UKY2]; see also Rick Mullin,
Tufts Study Finds Big Rise in Cost of Drug Development, CHEMICAL & ENGINEERING NEWS (Nov. 20,
2014),
https://cen.acs.org/articles/92/web/2014/11/Tufts-Study-Finds-Big-Rise.html
[https://perma.cc/G4KW-NBX8] (“[T]he cost of developing a prescription drug that gains market approval [is] $2.6 billion, a 145% increase, correcting for inflation, over the estimate the center made in
2003.”).
15. Cost to Develop New Pharmaceutical Drug Now Exceeds $2.5 Billion, supra note 14
(“[T]he Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America in particular, is really going to use [the
cost of research and development] to justify the high cost of drugs.” (quoting John LaMattina, senior
partner at PureTech and former Pfizer R&D head) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
16. Ingrid Torjesen, Drug Development: The Journey of a Medicine from Lab to Shelf,
PHARMACEUTICAL J.: TOMORROW’S PHARMACIST (May 12, 2015), https://www.pharmaceutical-journal.com/publications/tomorrows-pharmacist/drug-development-the-journey-of-a-medicine-from-labto-shelf/20068196.article?firstPass=false [https://perma.cc/3MDE-U45J].
17. Cost to Develop New Pharmaceutical Drug Now Exceeds $ 2.5 Billion, supra note 14.
18. Tufts Study Finds Big Rise in Cost of Drug Development, supra note 14 (providing that the
principal investigator and director of economic analysis commented that the high cost of failure in drug
development figured into the analysis).
19. See Suerie Moon, Powerful Ideas for Global Access to Medicines, 376 NEW ENG. J. MED.
505, 505–06 (2017) (noting that a U.N. work group recommended drug pricing transparency as one of
the solutions to access in LMICs).
20. WHO Guideline on Country Pharmaceutical Pricing Policies, WHO 1 (2015),
https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/153920/9789241549035_eng.pdf?sequence=1
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treatment for several conditions at the same time. For example, using the lowest priced generic medicines would take at least 17 days’ wages for the lowest
paid, unskilled government worker to purchase medicine for a child with
asthma, or an adult with diabetes, or an adult with a peptic ulcer.21 When one
examines utilizing treatment with an innovative brand, it would require 106
days’ salary for a month’s worth of treatment.22
According to the WHO, generic medicines can range from 1.9 to 3.5 times
the International Reference Price (the “IRP”), while in India, for example, essential medicines cost between 1.6 to 2.3 days’ wages for the lowest-paid government worker—and 80% of the population earns less than this wage.23 In
these countries, medicine accounts for 20% to 60% of health spending compared to 18% in countries with more advanced economic development.24 This
means that for over 90% of the population in developing countries, medicine is
no longer affordable, and the cost is a major burden on government budgets.25
In India, for example, the cost of asthma medicine can amount to nearly
three days’ wages for a government worker.26 However, as previously mentioned, most of the population earns less than an average government worker.27
In terms of availability, Beclomethasone28 and Salbutamol29 were available in
only 25% to 30% of the public health care facilities in only one of the five
Indian states included in the study.30 The price of these medications was 0.74
and 0.56 times higher than the IRP.31

[https://perma.cc/KT5L-QH7E].
21. See Medicine Price Surveys and Proposed Interventions to Improve Sustainable Access to
Affordable Medicines in 6 Sub-Saharan African Countries, WHO 1 (2006), https://apps.who.int/medicinedocs/documents/s14864b/s14864b.pdf [https://perma.cc/BHE7-STUW].
22. Id.
23. Alexandra Cameron, Margaret Ewen, Martin Auton & Dele Abegunde, The World Medicines Situation 2011: Medicine Prices, Availability and Affordability, WHO 1 (2011),
https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/world_medicines_situation/WMS_ch6_wPricing_v6.pdf
[https://perma.cc/5Y5X-4SH5] (“[The] average prices of generic medicines range from 1.9 to 3.5
times international reference prices . . . .”); A. Kotwani, Availability, Price and Affordability of Asthma
Medicines in Five Indian States, 13 INT’L J. TUBERCULOSIS & LUNG DISEASE 574, 574 (2009).
24. WHO Guideline on Country Pharmaceutical Pricing Policies, supra note 20, at 1.
25. Id.
26. Kotwani, supra note 23, at 574.
27. Id.
28. See Beclomethasone Inhalation, DRUGS.COM, https://www.drugs.com/mtm/beclomethasone-inhalation.html [https://perma.cc/TBP2-XGRA] (last visited May 9, 2017) (stating that Beclomethasone is a steroid that prevents the release of substances in the body that cause inflammation,
and it is used to prevent asthma).
29. See Salbutamol (Inhalation), DRUGS.COM, https://www.drugs.com/cons/salbutamol.html
[https://perma.cc/7L2T-CA6T] (last visited May 9, 2017) (stating that the generic name of Salbutamol
is Albuterol). Albuterol was originally approved by the FDA in 1981. See id. at Approval History.
30. See Kotwani, supra note 23, at 574.
31. Id.
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When it comes to an integrated delivery system, like an inhaler, the availability of asthma medicine continues to plummet. In India, the availability of
inhalers was poor in the private sector of four of the states studied, with some
as low as only 10% of the private facilities having access to inhalers.32 Moreover, when it comes to price, Beclomethasone was 0.87 to 1.49 times higher
than the IRP, and Salbutamol was 0.86 to 1.12 times higher than the IRP.33
Thus, essential medicines for asthma, which are used daily and on a long-term
basis, are unaffordable.34 Finally, in the public sector, where low-income populations seek treatment, “[s]teroid inhalers were not [as] readily available [as]
in the private sector.”35 Thus, essential asthma medicines were either unaffordable for the majority of the population36 and/or largely unavailable for the lowincome population.37 Consequently, it becomes difficult to strike a balance between pharmaceutical companies’ interests in their patents—and related income streams that fund new research and development—and individual countries’ public health concerns exacerbated by the weaknesses within their
economies. For these reasons, an enormous tension exists between the rights
of the international patent holder and the public health needs within developing
and third-world countries.
II. THE HISTORY OF COMPULSORY LICENSING
Meanwhile, the subject of compulsory licensing has rarely surfaced in the
United States in association with pharmaceutical patents.38 This is largely due
to the public interest, property rights, and the perception that it would impact
future research and development.39 Some have argued that corporate interests

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Grace K. Avedissian, Comment, Global Implications of a Potential U.S. Policy Shift Toward Compulsory Licensing of Medical Inventions in a New Era of “Super-Terrorism,” 18 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 237, 252, 245 n. 35 (2002) (citing Amy C. Carroll, Comment, Not Always the Best
Medicine: Biotechnology and the Global Impact of U.S. Patent Law, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2433, 2469
(1995)). Compulsory licensing in the United States has been used in copyright in literary and artistic
works, but rarely in pharmaceuticals due to the public interest in the development of technology, an
interest in property rights, and, arguably, by the lobbying efforts of pharmaceutical companies. See
generally Sara M. Ford, Compulsory Licensing Provisions Under the TRIPS Agreement: Balancing
Pills and Patents, 15 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 941, 953–54 (2000); William N. Monte, Compulsory Licensing of Patents, 25 INFO. & COMM. TECH. L. 247, 247–71 (2016).
39. See, e.g., Jerome H. Reichman, Comment: Compulsory Licensing of Patented Pharmaceutical
Inventions: Evaluating the Options, 37 J. L., MED. & ETHICS 247, 247–48 (2009). During the 2001
anthrax attacks, the United States government threatened to issue a compulsory license for
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in the United States outweigh individual interests. Lobbying by large corporations generally overshadows individual and small-group lobbying efforts by
consumers.40 However, on an international level, due to the large disparity in
cost and unavailability, developing countries are seeking compulsory licenses
of pharmaceuticals.41 This disparity between the cost and availability of pharmaceuticals was never more apparent than during the AIDS epidemic in SubSaharan Africa, like Kenya, for example.42 At that time, the WTO called compulsory licensing and access to AIDS medications a pressing public health issue.43 In fact, other countries like Canada temporarily manufactured some
AIDS and anti-malaria medicines in response to this public health issue and
exported them to African countries under a compulsory licensing scheme.44
The program was later rescinded.45
Many impoverished third-world countries have made compelling cases for
the expansion of compulsory licensing as a public health initiative.46 The past
ten years have seen the introduction of several initiatives to support countries
in managing pharmaceutical prices.47 However, it was felt that special

Ciprofloxacin if Bayer did not lower the price for the government. Id. Bayer lowered the price, and
the government backed down on the threat. Id.
40. See Amy C. Carroll, Comment, Not Always the Best Medicine: Biotechnology and the
Global Impact of U.S. Patent Law, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 2433, 2469 (1995); see also Ellen Daniel, US
Pharma Lobbying Spend Surged to 25.4 million in 2017, PHARMACEUTICAL TECH. (Jan. 26, 2018),
https://www.pharmaceutical-technology.com/news/us-pharma-lobbying-spend-surged-25-4m-2017
[https://perma.cc/RDV6-6G6V].
41. See generally Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation, Intersections Between Public Health, Intellectual Property and Trade: Extract From the WHO-WIPO-WTO Trilateral
Study,
WTO
(Mar.
7,
2017),
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/who-wipowto2013_par6_extract_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/S496-4XQ9]; see also Chapter 4: Medical Technologies: The Access Dimension, WTO: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: WHO–WIPO–WTO BOOK,
https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/trilatweb_e/ch4c_trilat_web_13_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/E33V-K5TQ] (last visited Nov. 2, 2019); John LaMattina, India’s Solution to Drug
Costs: Ignore Patents and Control Prices Except for Home Grown Drugs, FORBES (Apr. 8, 2013),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnlamattina/2013/04/08/indias-solution-to-drug-costs-ignore-patentsand-control-prices-except-for-home-grown-drugs/#491c664f2cba
[https://perma.cc/3KTX-6TSC]
(“The Glivec situation is not unique. . . . [Compulsory] licenses allow India generic drug manufacturers to make these drugs without impunity.”).
42. See Ben Sihanya, Patents, Parallel Importation and Compulsory Licensing of HIV/AIDS
Drugs: The Experience of Kenya, WTO: MANAGING THE CHALLENGES OF WTO PARTICIPATION:
CASE
STUDY
19
(July
8,
2011),
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/casestudies_e/case19_e.htm [https://perma.cc/M6Y3-4M6N].
43. Id.
44. See Promoting Access to Medical Technologies and Innovation, Intersections Between Public Health, Intellectual Property and Trade: Extract From the WHO-WIPO-WTO Trilateral Study,
supra note 41.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See Moon, supra note 19, at 506.
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consideration was needed in low-income and developing countries, in which
the pharmaceutical sector was less regulated.48
Eventually, a committee of countries was formed at the WTO Ministerial
Conference to address the issue over a period of several years.49 This committee of countries, working under the auspices of the WTO, determined that the
public health issues in the countries seeking a compulsory license is of greater
importance than the rights of an individual corporate patent holder.50 Countries
such as India, Canada, Mexico, Qatar, and several Sub-Saharan countries, and
even China, have been seeking compulsory licenses.51 Each of these countries
has been lobbying the WTO to expand the compulsory licensing on several
classes of pharmaceuticals.52
By 2001, via the Doha Declaration, a compulsory licensing exception was
allowed under the TRIPS Agreement—provided that certain procedures and
conditions were fulfilled.53 These criteria are the following: (1) a generic copy
of a drug is produced mainly for the domestic market of that country; (2) it
should not be made for export; (3) used for a pressing public health need or
emergency public health situation; (4) the producer of the generic copy has attempted to negotiate a voluntary license on reasonable commercial terms; (5)
only if the negotiations fail can a compulsory license be issued; and (6) some
countries require that the patent be active for three to six years before a compulsory license application can be considered.54
48. WHO Guideline on Country Pharmaceutical Pricing Policies, supra note 20, at 3.
49. The Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WHO,
https://www.who.int/medicines/areas/policy/doha_declaration/en [https://perma.cc/BAF3-S9CP] (last
visited Oct. 3, 2019); see also Module IX: TRIPS and Public Health, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/ta_docs_e/modules9_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/9H2G-NDWZ] (last visited Nov. 2,
2019).
50. Reichman, supra note 39, at 250.
51. Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports, WTO NEWS: 2003 PRESS
RELEASES
(Aug.
30,
2003),
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres03_e/pr350_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/8EH8-PZSB]; see also Draft Reference Document on the Exception Regarding Compulsory
Licensing:
Annex,
SCP/30/3,
WIPO
20
(May
21,
2019),
https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_30/scp_30_3-main1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2296MYC9].
52. Colleen Chien, Cheap Drugs at What Price to Innovation: Does the Compulsory Licensing
of Pharmaceuticals Hurt Innovation?, 18 BERKELEY TECH L. J. 853, 871 (2003); Exceptions and Limitations to Patent Rights: Compulsory Licenses and/or Government Use (Part I), SCP/21/4 Rev.,
WIPO 5 (Nov. 3, 2014), https://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/scp/en/scp_21/scp_21_4_rev.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YLA2-PKKS] (referencing additional reasons given by developing countries to allow extended compulsory licensing).
53. See Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, WTO
(Nov. 20, 2001), https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2YRB-467B]; see also Draft Reference Document on the Exception Regarding Compulsory Licensing: Annex, supra note 51, at 7–8.
54. See Draft Reference Document on the Exception Regarding Compulsory Licensing: Annex,
supra note 51, at 6–8; Id. at 7–8 (stating that under Article 31 of the TRIPS Agreement, a compulsory
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The conditions for maintenance of the compulsory license are: (1) the patent holder shall be paid adequate renumeration in the circumstances of each
case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization; and (2) the
generic copy produced cannot be exported out of the country seeking the compulsory license.55 Additionally, after the Doha Declaration, the requirement to
attempt to obtain a license was relaxed in cases of “national emergency,” “other
circumstances of extreme urgency,” and “public non-commercial use,” so that
the first step of negotiating a voluntary license can be bypassed in order to save
time.56 Despite this expansion of rights by the licensee, the patent owner still
has to be paid.57
III. ENFORCEMENT
A compulsory license creates a quasi-contractual obligation between the
patent holder and the licensee, which originates in a Member State and is

license is authorized only under specific conditions, including: (1) the “user has made efforts to obtain
authorization from the right holder on reasonable commercial terms and conditions and that such efforts have not been successful within a reasonable period of time,” (2) the compulsory license is limited
to domestic use, (3) the compulsory license is non-exclusive (generic), (4) the compulsory license is
not used to create product for export, (5) and the compulsory license is used for a pressing public health
or emergency); see also id. at 17 (“According to Article 46, at the request of any person made after the
expiry of a period of four years from the filing date of the patent application or three years from the
date of grant of the patent . . . .”); Id. at 30 (“In most countries, the time period during which compulsory licenses may not be granted on the grounds of non-working or insufficient working is three years
from the date of the grant of the patent or four years from the filing date of the application. The
applicable laws of many of those countries further specify that the said time period lasts three years
from the date of grant or four years from the filing date, whichever period expires later. In addition,
in a few countries, a compulsory license may be granted if the exploitation of the patented invention
has been interrupted for more than one year [Argentina and Costa Rica], and in two countries, for more
than three years [Turkey and Ukraine]. Some other variations found in the applicable laws are, for
example, ‘three years from the date of the grant of the patent’ [Azerbaijan, Brazil, Honduras, Hong
Kong (China), India, Netherlands, Qatar, and the United Kingdom], ‘three’ or ‘five’ years from the
date of publication of the mention of the grant [Turkey, Ukraine, and Tajikistan] ‘3 years after sealing’
[Australia], or ‘three years of non-working’ [Monaco].”).
55. See Draft Reference Document on the Exception Regarding Compulsory Licensing: Annex,
supra note 51, at 78. According to Article 31, compulsory licensing is allowed provided “the following
conditions [are] respected: . . .
(f) such use shall be authorized predominantly for the supply of the domestic market of the Member
authorizing such use; . . . (h) the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances
of each case, taking into account the economic value of the authorization . . . .” Id. Under the Paris
Convention, a special compulsory license is required in order to export a pharmaceutical. See id. at 6–
9.
56. Dianne Nicol & Olasupo Owoeye, Using TRIPS Flexibilities to Facilitate Access to Medicines, 91 BULL WORLD HEALTH ORGAN. 533, 533–34 (2013).
57. Implementation of Paragraph 6 of the Doha Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WTO (Sept. 1 2003), https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/implem_para6_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/678R-JXUS].

1_21_20 MCKENZIE (DO NOT DELETE)

162

MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV.

1/28/20 2:45 PM

[Vol. 23:2

enforced by the WTO.58 Generally, as previously mentioned, there are clear
criteria that must be satisfied in order to obtain the license and distinct actions
to avoid.59 But what happens when the contractual compulsory license is
breached? Who decides what payment is “adequate” or what constitutes an
“emergency” or an “urgent situation”? Which country or organization has jurisdiction? What, if any, enforcement power does that court have? Some of
these inherent unresolved issues involved in compulsory licensing, such as jurisdiction and enforcement, have been exacerbated by recent compulsory licensing disputes.
The TRIPS Agreement states that the patent owner must be given the right
to appeal the compensation or the validity of the compulsory license.60 The
appeal is filed in the country in possession of the compulsory license.61 Additionally, the 2001 WTO Ministerial Conference in Doha decided that countries
that are unable to manufacture pharmaceuticals should be given opportunities
to obtain cheaper copies elsewhere.62 This expands the requirement that drugs
be restricted to the domestic market, provided that certain conditions are met.63
To make matters more complicated, eleven countries announced that they
would only import in situations of a national emergency or other circumstances
of extreme urgency: China (including Hong Kong and Macao), Israel, Korea,
Kuwait, Mexico, Qatar, Singapore, Taiwan, Turkey, and the United Arab

58. See Draft Reference Document on the Exception Regarding Compulsory Licensing: Annex,
supra note 51, at 7 (“WTO Member [States] have an obligation to comply, inter alia, with Articles 5A
of the Paris Convention concerning compulsory licenses.”).
59. See discussion supra.
60. See Draft Reference Document on the Exception Regarding Compulsory Licensing: Annex,
supra note 51, at 8 (“According to Article 31, where the law of the Member allows for other use of the
subject matter of patent without authorization of the right holder, the following conditions shall be
respected: . . . (i) the legal validity of any decision relating to the authorization of such use shall be
subject to judicial review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority in that Member;
(j) the decision relating to the remuneration provided in respect of such use shall be subject to judicial
review or other independent review by a distinct higher authority in that Member . . . .”); see also
Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, supra note 5.
61. See Draft Reference Document on the Exception Regarding Compulsory Licensing: Annex,
supra note 51, at 41–42 (discussing many pharmaceutical compulsory licensing appeals filed in Member States, one of which was the Raltegravir compulsory patent case filed in Federal Court of Justice
in Germany).
62. See Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports, supra note 51; see
also Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, supra note 53, at 2 (“WTO members
with insufficient or no manufacturing capacities in the pharmaceutical sector could face difficulties in
making effective use of compulsory licensing under the TRIPS Agreement.”).
63. See Decision Removes Final Patent Obstacle to Cheap Drug Imports, supra note 51; see
also Sisule F. Musungu & Cecilia Oh, The Use of Flexibilities in TRIPS by Developing Countries: Can
They Promote Access to Medicines?, COMMISSION ON INTELL. PROP. RIGHTS, INNOVATION & PUB.
HEALTH (CIPIH) 15 (Aug. 2005), https://www.who.int/intellectualproperty/studies/TRIPSFLEXI.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J3L9-WGXJ].
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Emirates.64 However, the TRIPS Agreement requires that if a country plans to
export a generic copy, they must change the laws within their country that recognize patented materials.65 This is known as the “Paragraph 6” decision,
which came out of the Doha Declaration in 2003.66 Thus far, nineteen countries
have formally informed the TRIPS Council that they have made the required
changes.67
In terms of a challenge to a compulsory license, one of the most well-reported compulsory license cases to date is in regard to Novartis’ drug,
Gleevec,68 a treatment for leukemia.69 The Indian government issued a compulsory license to manufacturer, copy, and produce the drug.70 Novartis sued
to block the ruling of the Chennai senior court of India, saying that “it violated
[the] . . . WTO rules on intellectual property that India had adopted.”71 Novartis
also argued that an adverse ruling against their patent would “stifle the

64. See Roger Kampf, Special Compulsory Licences for Export of Medicines: Key Features of
WTO Members’ Implementing Legislation, WTO ECON. RES. & STAT. DIVISION (July 31, 2015),
https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/ersd201507_e.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS75-UPBM].
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.; Members’ Laws Implementing the ‘Paragraph 6’ System, WTO: INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: TRIPS AND HEALTH, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/par6laws_e.htm
[https://perma.cc/EDH4-ZVSV] (last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (listing the following countries that have
changed their laws in order to have the ability to export: Albania, Australia, Botswana, Canada, China,
Croatia, Cuba, European Union, Hong Kong, India, Kazakhstan, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Philippines, Korea, Singapore, Switzerland, and Chinese Taipei).
68. See Leslie A. Pray, Gleevec: The Breakthrough in Cancer Treatment, 1 NATURE EDUC. 37
(2008) (finding that there was a phenomenal success rate of patient’s white blood cell production,
which returned to a normal range while on Gleevec); see also Gleevec, DRUGS.COM. (July 1, 2019),
https://www.drugs.com/gleevec.html [https://perma.cc/9ZB2-ZGZA] (stating that Gleevec is approved for leukemia, bone marrow disorders, and certain tumors of the stomach and digestive system).
69. LaMattina, supra note 41.
70. See Vikas Bajaj & Andrew Pollack, India’s Supreme Court to Hear Dispute on Drug Patents, N.Y. TIMES, at B1 (Mar. 6, 2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/07/business/global/indiassupreme-court-to-hear-long-simmering-dispute-on-drug-patents.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=F46019393E275FAA4D4D24E6E9405F26&gwt=pay&assetType=RE
GIWALL [https://perma.cc/RTJ7-9S6G]; see also Roger Collier, Drug Patents: The Evergreening
Problem, 185 CANADIAN MED. ASS’N E385, E385–86 (2013) (discussing the Indian Supreme Court’s
refusal to issue a patent to Novartis for a new version of its cancer drug Gleevec). The Indian government allowed some generic manufacturers in India to produce Gleevec in India. See Sarah Hiddleston,
Finally, the Patents Prevail, THE HINDU (Apr. 7, 2013), https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/finally-the-patients-prevail/article4588890.ece [https://perma.cc/LC4N-8V63]. Novartis applied for exclusive marketing rights under the Indian Patent Act—which would effectively prohibit the generic
manufacture of Gleevec in India. See id. In 2005, India notified the TRIPS Council of changes to its
intellectual property standards dealing with incremental changes in a drug which extends the life of a
patent. See id. Minor changes to extend the patent life of a drug is otherwise known as “evergreening.”
See id.
71. T.V. Padma, Indian Court Rejects Novartis Patent, NATURE (Apr. 1, 2013),
https://www.nature.com/news/indian-court-rejects-novartis-patent-1.12717 [https://perma.cc/9K3KGETE].
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country’s access to new medicines.”72 In 2007, the court rejected Novartis’
challenge.73 Novartis then appealed to the Indian Supreme Court in 2009.74
However, the Indian Supreme Court rejected Novartis’ claim based on section
3(d) of the Indian Patent Act,75 which states that:
the mere discovery of a new form of a known substance which does
not result in the enhancement of the known efficacy of that substance
or the mere discovery of any new property or new use for a known
substance or of the mere use of a known process, machine or apparatus
unless such known process results in a new product or employs at least
one new reactant.76
The Indian Supreme Court also rejected Novartis’ expectation that making
minor changes to their drug would provide extended patent protection for another twenty years.77 The Court ruled that minor modifications to a drug,
known as “evergreening,” is a tactic that would not work in India, saying that
marketing the modified version of Gleevec, also known as Glivec, “fails in both
the tests of invention and patentability.”78
The WTO has an arbitration and mediation division that has jurisdiction
over compulsory licensing disputes under the TRIPS Agreement.79 However,
it has admitted that it cannot agree on how to settle the cases of compulsory
licensing.80 The United States Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) has no

72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.; Hiddleston, supra note 70.
76. The Patents Act, 1970 § 3(d), No. 39 of 1970, INDIA CODE (2017),
http://www.ipindia.nic.in/writereaddata/Portal/IPOAct/1_31_1_patent-act-1970-11march2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7ZJV-HP2H].
77. Padma, supra note 71.
78. Id.
79. See Disputes Concerning the TRIPS Agreement, WTO, https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/intel5_e.htm [https://perma.cc/C9VG-J4DF]; Dispute Settlement 3.1 Overview,
U.N. CONF. ON TRADE & DEV. 43 (2003), https://unctad.org/en/Docs/edmmisc232add11_en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X7DS-CJ8Z] (last visited Oct. 5, 2019).
80. See Little-Used ‘Par.6’ System Will Have Its Day, WHO Tells Intellectual Property and
Health Review, WTO: 2010 NEWS ITEMS (Oct. 26–27, 2010), https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news10_e/trip_26oct10_e.htm [https://perma.cc/BZ37-WTX3] (“The WTO Secretariat
explained the legal difference between countries introducing laws to implement the system and their
notifying the WTO that they have accepted the amendment. The two are separate and do not depend
on each other. . . . When a country accepts the amendment, it effectively affirms that it accepts an
additional flexibility in the TRIPS agreement, and that other countries have the legal right to use the
system if they choose to do so. Accepting the amendment does not mean that the country necessarily
wants to use the system itself. Nor does it mean the country has to implement the system through its
own laws or regulations.”).
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jurisdiction over international compulsory licensing disputes other than to exercise some quality control from time to time during spot inspections over drugs
that are produced for import into the United States market.81
IV. GEORGIA-PACIFIC FRAMEWORK FOR COMPULSORY LICENSING DISPUTES
When one considers that a violation of an involuntary, or compulsory, license82 is really an infringement case,83 we can review tests that currently exist
to determine what damages, if any, an infringer should pay the patent holder.
Recall that under the TRIPS Agreement and Doha Declaration, regardless of
how expansive the ability is to obtain a compulsory license, the patent holder
must still be given reasonable compensation.84 Furthermore, whether a framework exists—either within that country or at the WTO—to analyze the competing equities of the case to help the parties reach a resolution of the matter
and a conclusion on reasonable compensation is still up for debate.
Some outlying issues revolve around the definition of “adequate renumeration in the circumstances,” which is referred to in the TRIPS Agreement.85
Generally, this is considered the royalty on the license.86 If a license was not

81. See 21 C.F.R. § 10.90 (2019) (governing the FDA’s regulatory authority over domestic
manufacturers, repackaging of pharmaceuticals, and engagement in Memorandum of Understanding
with foreign manufacturers); see also International Agreements, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (July 7,
2019),
https://www.fda.gov/international-programs/international-arrangements
[https://perma.cc/U8UB-Y4ZD] (discussing Cooperative Agreements and Memorandum of Understanding); Foreign Pharmaceutical Manufacturers (5/96): Guide to Inspection of Foreign Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. (Aug. 26, 2014), https://www.fda.gov/inspections-compliance-enforcement-and-criminal-investigations/inspection-guides/foreignpharmaceutical-manufacturers-596 [https://perma.cc/D8UV-3T8T] (“[T]he authority to inspect foreign drug facilities does not come from Section 704 of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act (the Act,) but
from the agency’s ability to exercise Section 801 of the Act and commitments made by the sponsors
of applications, if applicable. For that reason, the agency is not required to provide stringent documentary evidence to establish violations of the Act. However, the inspection team is expected to collect sufficient records to substantiate its findings and to aid in the further review process by the
agency.”).
82. See Compulsory Licensing of Pharmaceuticals and TRIPS, supra note 5.
83. See Icahn Sch. of Med. at Mount Sinai v. Neurocrine Biosciences, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 3d
322, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (holding that “Neurocrine’s grant of an unauthorized de facto sublicense
that arose when Neurocrine transferred to AbbVie the right to exclusively direct and control use of the
Sealfon drug discovery tools” alleged a prima facie case for damages and royalties).
84. See discussion supra.
85. Part II–Standards Concerning the Availability, Scope and Use of Intellectual Property
Rights, URUGUAY ROUND AGREEMENT: TRIPS, https://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27trips_04c_e.htm [https://perma.cc/UPV3-Z7DW] (last visited Sept. 30, 2019). Article 31(h) states that
“the right holder shall be paid adequate remuneration in the circumstances of each case, taking into
account the economic value of the authorization.” Id.
86. See Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1127 (S.D.N.Y.
1970) (“[T]he recovery of a reasonable royalty for the very purpose of affording fair compensation in
cases such as this, where the victimized patentee is unable to prove that he lost a measurable amount
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obtained, it would be an infringement of the patent, and the party could sue for
damages.87 In infringement cases, one approach to determine damages is to
calculate what the reasonable royalty rate would have been had the license been
obtained.88 Thus, damages are based on the amount of the product sold and the
prejudice to the patent holder’s development of the patent.89
This is not unlike the Indian Patent Act requirement that the patented invention must be “worked in,” or manufactured in, the country.90 In the Novartis
case, the Indian Supreme Court determined that Novartis was not even active
in the market where the compulsory license was being used, or was so inactive,
that the damages were negligible.91 What could also be relevant would be the
sales in other markets in which the patent holder may become active.92
What if the country only wants the license for use in a discrete market in
their country, like for the extremely poor and underserved, much like how the
Department of Health and Human Services in the United States serves the poor
under Medicaid 93 and seeks to carve out government discount prices for this
discrete group? Recall the Cipro case, in which the United States government

of profits as the result of the infringement.”); see also Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d
1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
87. See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1127 (“[A] reasonable royalty is an alternative way of
recovering general compensatory damages and that it is not equitable or commensurable with actual
damages computed in terms of demonstrably proved lost profits.”).
88. See id.; see also Lucent Techs., Inc., 580 F.3d at 1324.
89. See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1141 (discussing the effect that the infringement had
on the development of the product in a certain market). “[T]he two most important factors to be considered in negotiating a license are ‘probably, the nature of the product’ and how competitive the market was for that product.” Id.
90. See Rahul Chaudhry, Local Working of Patents in India: An Analysis, IAM (Sept. 12, 2016),
https://www.iam-media.com/local-working-patents-india-analysis [https://perma.cc/TVY8-PAEM];
Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120 (“The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee, such as, whether they are competitors in the same territory in the same line of business; or whether
they are inventor and promoter.”); Peter Roderick & Allyson M. Pollok, India’s Patent Laws Under
Pressure, 380 LANCET e2, e3 (Sept. 15, 2012) (commenting that the Indian Patent Act requires “that
the patented invention is not worked in the territory of India”); see also The Patents Act, 1970 § 84,
No. 39 of 1970, INDIA CODE (2017), http://www.ipindia.nic.in/writereaddata/Portal/IPOAct/1_31_1_patent-act-1970-11march2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7ZJV-HP2H].
91. See Roderick & Pollok, supra note 90, at e3 (commenting on the Indian Patent Act and the
view that “‘worked in the territory of India’ means ‘manufactured to a reasonable extent in India’”).
92. See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120 (“The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by granting
licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.”).
93. See Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, CENTERS FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVICES,
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid/prescription-drugs/medicaid-drug-rebate-program/index.html
[https://perma.cc/NZT5-MPGC] (last visited Nov. 2, 2019) (“The Medicaid Drug Rebate Program . . .
is a program that includes . . . participating drug manufacturers that helps to offset the Federal and state
costs of most outpatient prescription drugs dispensed to Medicaid patients. Approximately 600 drug
manufacturers currently participate in this program.”).
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pressured Bayer to lower the price for government contract use, under the threat
of imposing a compulsory license on the product.94
There are several factors to consider in a licensing analysis, including market size, target groups, ability to produce the product, amount sold, whether it
is sold in a competing market, what profit would the company have made, actual versus lost profit and the like, and whether it is being exported to another
market.95 Thus, the damages/royalty (or renumeration portion) of the breach of
a compulsory license calls for a more nuanced approach.
Arguably, the most detailed analysis of royalty damages in a patent infringement case comes from the Georgia-Pacific case.96 It is the seminal case
that identifies what a reasonable royalty would be in a patent infringement
case.97 In Georgia-Pacific, the court compiled a list of factors to determine
reasonable royalty rates.98 These factors have been “widely cited in patent litigation, although . . . criticized for looking at the issue as if products required
only one patent and ignored the royalty rate stacking present in many complex
high technology products.”99 However, since we are examining a single drug
patent, the shoe fits. The Georgia-Pacific factors are:
1. The royalties received by the patentee for the licensing of the patent
in suit, proving or tending to prove an established royalty.
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable to the patent in suit.
3. The nature and scope of the license, as exclusive or non-exclusive;
or as restricted or non-restricted in terms of territory or with respect
to whom the manufactured product may be sold.
4. The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain his patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention
or by granting licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.

94. See Reichman, supra note 39, at 250.
95. See generally Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120–21 (“[T]here is a multiplicity of interpenetrating factors bearing upon the amount of a reasonable royalty. But there is no formula by which
these factors can be rated precisely in the order of their relative importance or by which their economic
significance can be automatically transduced into their pecuniary equivalent.”).
96. Id. at 1120 (discussing a dispute namely over patented wood products and plywood made
from trees).
97. See Glenn S. Newman et al., How Reasonable Is Your Royalty, J. ACCOUNTANCY (Sept. 1,
2008) (noting that Mr. Newman is the principal in charge of Parente Randolph LLC’s Forensic &
Litigation Services based practice in Philadelphia).
98. Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
99. Georgia-Pacific Factors, TECH. & IP L. GLOSSARY, http://www.ipglossary.com/glossary/georgia-pacific-factors/#.XZLYQS2ZPxU [https://perma.cc/G4ZH-XVJL] (last visited Sept. 30,
2019) (elaborating on the Georgia-Pacific factors).
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5. The commercial relationship between the licensor and licensee,
such as, whether they are competitors in the same territory in the
same line of business; or whether they are inventor and promoter.
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of
other products of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to
the licensor as a generator of sales of his non-patented items; and
the extent of such derivative or convoyed sales.
7. The duration of the patent and the term of the license.
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent;
its commercial success; and its current popularity.
9. The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes
or devices, if any, that had been used for working out similar results.
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and
the benefits to those who have used the invention.
11. The extent to which the infringer has made use of the invention; and
any evidence probative of the value of that use.
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the particular business or in comparable businesses to allow
for the use of the invention or analogous inventions.
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the
invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or improvements added by the infringer.
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee
(such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach an agreement; that is, the amount that a prudent licensee - who desired, as a business proposition, to obtain a license to
manufacture and sell a particular article embodying the patented
invention - would have been willing to pay as a royalty and yet be
able to make a reasonable profit and which amount would have
been acceptable by a prudent patentee who was willing to grant a
license.100
The Georgia-Pacific factors provide a more structured analysis than the
TRIPS Agreement and Doha Declaration, which left many terms undefined and

100. Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
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vague.101 Obviously, these factors would be up to a factfinder to determine.102
However, they can be a useful tool in mediation and arbitration of compulsory
licensing disputes by helping the parties employ a more objective and factbased approach.103
With a more structured and uniform approach, a company can also look
forward to some level of predictability in compulsory licensing disputes. Companies do not like vagueness because it breeds uncertainty.104 Pharmaceutical
corporations detest uncertainty because it prohibits them from making concrete
plans for allocating risk and making determinations of liability or exposure to
patent challenges, as well as in royalty litigation.105 “[T]he IP landscape remains decidedly murky, and the sector is not in for an easy time as it continues
to fight its corner.”106
In order to provide strategic planning regarding infringement litigation, licensing, and/or concession of the royalty owed, a patent holder also needs to
know what types of evidence are required, including how many years the product needs to be marketed in a certain country, and what the potential of that
market—or market share—is in that country.107 For instance, if the market
share is so slight, the company may not have made any effort to establish sales

101. See, e.g., Ford, supra note 38, at 960.
102. See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1121 (“In discharging its responsibility as fact finder,
the Court has attempted to exercise a discriminating judgment reflecting its ultimate appraisal of all
pertinent factors in the context of the credible evidence”.).
103. See id. (commenting on using a fact-based approach). In comparison to the fact-based
approach outlined in Georgia-Pacific, in India, there is what has been described as a hit or miss approach used by pharmaceutical companies seeking to do business in India. See generally Ravinder
Gabble & Jillian Clare Kohler, “To Patent or Not to Patent? The Case of Novartis’ Cancer Drug
Glivec in India,” 10 GLOBAL HEALTH 1, 2 (2014).
104. Brian D. Smith, Managing Pharma’s Uncertainty, PMLIVE (July 25, 2014),
http://www.pmlive.com/pharma_news/managing_pharmas_uncertainty_588689
[https://perma.cc/LP8U-GEMZ] (“Historically, strategic planning in life sciences has been about estimating risks and placing bets accordingly; the best estimators won a blockbuster. But what about
when, as now, a period of intense turbulence makes some risks, especially long term and strategic risks,
impossible to estimate?”).
105. See, e.g., Dylan Scott, Supreme Court’s Ruling in Patent Case a Blow to Drug Industry,
STAT NEWS: POLITICS (June 20, 2016), https://www.statnews.com/2016/06/20/supreme-court-rulesagainst-drug-industry-in-patent-case/ [https://perma.cc/V3D8-HFNZ] (commenting that “uncertainty
. . . stifles innovation” in the pharmaceutical industry (citing Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136
S. Ct. 2131 (2016) with regard to uncertainty in reviewing patent claims) (internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Smith, supra note 104 (commenting that quantitative data is easier to use to track
risks associated with bringing a pharmaceutical product to market and managing it throughout its patent lifecycle). See generally Helen Sloan, More Fears for Pharma IP Rights in India as Novartis
Heads for the Supreme Court, IAM (Aug. 20, 2012), https://www.iam-media.com/law-policy/morefears-pharma-ip-rights-india-novartis-heads-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/T2WZ-KBV5].
106. Sloan, supra note 105.
107. See generally Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
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or production in that country, and thus, the company would not have any damages.
Additionally, the Georgia-Pacific factors take into consideration the issue
of “evergreening.”108 Georgia-Pacific factor (9) states: “The utility and advantages of the patent property over the old modes or devices, if any, that had
been used for working out similar results.”109 If the product that is allegedly
infringed actually has no discernable additional market value or improvement
over the previous product, under Georgia-Pacific, the damages would also be
negligible.110 An infringement of a patent that is only incrementally different
is dispositive for the party bringing the infringement case.111
LMICs have been critical of the practice of “evergreening” and extending
patent protection by adding marginally valuable changes to the patented invention, such as an enteric coating, splitting the product into twice a day delivery
system, or adding a non-active irrelevant ingredient for the purpose of extending the patent life.112 Regarding the effect of “working in” or producing, selling, and manufacturing a product in a specific market, we look to GeorgiaPacific factors (4) and (6), which state:
4. The licensor’s established policy and marketing program to maintain
his patent monopoly by not licensing others to use the invention or by
granting licenses under special conditions designed to preserve that monopoly.
...
6. The effect of selling the patented specialty in promoting sales of other
products of the licensee; the existing value of the invention to the licensor as a generator of sales of his non-patented items; and the extent of
such derivative or convoyed sales.113
Thus, the factors provide a more detailed description of “worked in” than
the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration, and other countries’ amended
Paris Convention agreements. For instance, “Bayer acquired an importing
108. See Collier, supra note 70, at E385–86.
109. Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
110. See id. at 1121 (“[T]he patentee could ‘show the value by proving what would have been
a reasonable royalty, considering the nature of the invention, its utility and advantages, . . . the extent
of the use involved’ . . . [,] and commercial value as evidenced by its advantages over other devices
. . . .”).
111. See, e.g., id. at 1138 (commenting that a product that was completely different than
Weldtex or GP Striated did not, therefore, have a bearing on the license infringement issue before the
court).
112. See Collier, supra note 70, at E385 (discussing evergreening and the impact on developing
countries).
113. Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1120.
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license for Nexavar—the company’s brand name for sorafenib tosylate—in
2007” (which is approved for the treatment of kidney cancer).114 The patent
was granted one year later.115 Bayer claimed that Nexavar’s sales in India were
undermined by the marketing of a similar drug by another domestic generic
producer, CIPLA, which Bayer sued for infringement.116 However, according
to the Indian Patent Office, Bayer did not begin importing the drug into India
in 2008 and had only small quantities on hand during the following two years.117
The Indian Patent Office determined that Bayer did not “take adequate steps to
start the working of the invention in the territory of India on a commercial scale
and to an adequate extent.”118
In terms of “adequate compensation,” the world of compulsory licensing
becomes even murkier. Compensation is deemed reasonable within the context
of the sales in that particular territory.119 Georgia-Pacific also provides a more
detailed analysis in this area under factors (2), (8), (12), (13), and (15), which
each state:
2. The rates paid by the licensee for the use of other patents comparable
to the patent in suit.
...
8. The established profitability of the product made under the patent; its
commercial success; and its current popularity.
...
12. The portion of the profit or of the selling price that may be customary in the particular business or in comparable businesses to allow for
the use of the invention or analogous inventions.
...
13. The portion of the realizable profit that should be credited to the
invention as distinguished from non-patented elements, the manufacturing process, business risks, or significant features or improvements
added by the infringer.
...
15. The amount that a licensor (such as the patentee) and a licensee
(such as the infringer) would have agreed upon (at the time the infringement began) if both had been reasonably and voluntarily trying to reach
an agreement; that is, the amount that a prudent licensee - who desired,
114. See India Grants First Compulsory license to Generic Drug Producer, 16 BRIDGES 6, 7
(2012).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. See Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1124 (beginning the reasonable royalty rate analysis
with the amount of sale in the territory in question).
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as a business proposition, to obtain a license to manufacture and sell a
particular article embodying the patented invention – would have been
willing to pay as a royalty and yet be able to make a reasonable profit
and which amount would have been acceptable by a prudent patentee
who was willing to grant a license.120
Therefore, the factors provide us with an economic and factual analysis,
rather than a vague statement of “the patent holder must be paid adequately.”
These factors point to an analysis in the context of what has been paid before,
what is traditionally the going price for a license in the specific market, what
does a manufacturer of generics typically make in profits, and what, if any,
would they be willing to pay to license the drug to produce it domestically.
This analysis fleshes out the statutory protections afforded to a patent holder
when the patent is infringed.121 This structured analysis provides a starting
point for a fact-based economic analysis that uses historical data.
Georgia-Pacific also provides for the use of expert testimony to analyze
and assist the factfinder in determining a contested issue.122 It also examines
the nature of the invention and whether it provides any appreciable difference
to the consumer, as stated in factors (10) and (14):
10. The nature of the patented invention; the character of the commercial embodiment of it as owned and produced by the licensor; and the
benefits to those who have used the invention.
...
14. The opinion testimony of qualified experts.123
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the equities of pharmaceutical companies and the interests
of consumers in LMICs, as well as the countries themselves, cannot be more
diametrically opposed to one another. At the same time, a statutory scheme has
laid out a solution to affordability and availability in the form of compulsory
licensing. If pharmaceutical companies hope to navigate these murky waters
and seek to regain any portion of their lost profits, they would do well to study
the Georgia-Pacific factor analysis as they prepare to argue their case under the
authority of the TRIPS Agreement, the Doha Declaration, and local government patent laws.
120. Id. at 1120.
121. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2012); Draft Reference Document on the Exception Regarding Compulsory Licensing, supra note 51, at 8.
122. Georgia-Pacific, 318 F. Supp. at 1117.
123. Id. at 1120.
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Similarly, the WTO has expressed frustration with the mediation and arbitration division in terms of settlement of compulsory licensing disputes. The
Doha Declaration expanded the rights of licensees, but left little concrete explanations of the terms “adequate,” “emergency,” and “urgent situations.”
The uncertainty within the Doha Declaration does not lend itself to the settlement of cases. In some ways, the solution to compulsory licensing can seem
as difficult as “seeing a forest through the trees.”124 There are so many competing interests, and so much at stake, that it seems impossible to pick out salient issues for parties to agree upon. Without a fact-based and clear-eyed analysis, mediation of these disputes cannot make any headway. Rather, it leads to
more litigation.
Notably, the Novartis case lasted several years before the issue was settled.
If countries believe that the availability and affordability of medications is a
pressing public health issue, they would do well to tighten up the definitions
and requirements of compulsory licensing, so parties may have a clear roadmap
to navigate these highly contested issues.
With a fact-based framework, such as Georgia-Pacific as a guide, the WTO
can apply a more comprehensive and fact-based analysis to compulsory licensing disputes. If the WTO wishes to reengage in international mediation and
arbitration in these complex disputes, adopting a mediation framework—as laid
out in Georgia-Pacific—would help each party understand the key issues in
dispute. In this way, parties may be able to realistically understand their exposure, realistically understand their obligations under their agreements, and approach negotiations much sooner, rather than litigate these issues while the general public in their country suffers under the high cost of medications.
The WTO should consider amending the Doha Declaration with more factspecific criteria for the issuance of a compulsory license, criteria to challenge
the license, as well as historical fact-based information to determine the reasonable compensation for the patent holder. With such a fact-based and detailed
framework for analyzing this complex issue, patent holders will be better informed of their rights and licensees can become better-informed stakeholders.
Both the drug company and the LMIC are stakeholders in this quasi-contractual
agreement called a compulsory license—an agreement created by the pressing
public health need for medication, availability, and affordability.

124. See the Forest for the Trees, WIKTIONARY, https://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/see_the_forest_for_the_trees [https://perma.cc/49BD-HTC7] (last visited Oct. 4, 2019); see also Miss the Forest
for the Trees, REVERSO ENGLISH DICTIONARY, https://dictionary.reverso.net/english-definition/miss%20the%20forest%20for%20the%20trees [https://perma.cc/9UHF-QU4A] (last visited Sept.
21, 2019). This phrase can also mean that one is so focused on the details or intricacies of something
that they miss the big picture or the main point. See the Forest for the Trees, supra note 124.
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By adopting the reasoned, carefully laid out framework as presented in
Georgia-Pacific, and using it to determine a fair compensation in compulsory
licensing, it can allow factfinders, mediators, and stakeholders to find the “forest through the trees” among the complex competing equities within the myriad
of details of international compulsory licensing of pharmaceuticals.

